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Does Disclosure Reduce Pollution?  
Evidence from India’s Green Rating Project 
Nicholas Powers, Allen Blackman, Thomas P. Lyon, and Urvashi Narain 
Abstract 
Public disclosure programs that collect and disseminate information about firms’ environmental 
performance are increasingly popular in both developed and developing countries. Yet little is known 
about whether they actually improve environmental performance, particularly in the latter setting. We use 
detailed plant-level survey data to evaluate the impact of India’s Green Rating Project (GRP) on the 
environmental performance of the country’s largest pulp and paper plants. We find that the GRP drove 
significant reductions in pollution loadings among dirty plants but not among cleaner ones. This result 
comports with statistical and anecdotal evaluations of similar disclosure programs. We also find that 
plants located in wealthier communities were more responsive to GRP ratings, as were single-plant firms.  
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Does Disclosure Reduce Pollution?  
Evidence from India’s Green Rating Project 
Nicholas Powers, Allen Blackman, Thomas P. Lyon, and Urvashi Narain∗ 
1. Introduction 
Programs that collect and disseminate information about firms’ environmental 
performance have been characterized as the “third wave” in environmental regulation, after 
command-and-control and market-based approaches [1]. Two types of national public disclosure 
programs have emerged over the past two decades [2]. So-called pollutant release transfer 
registries simply report emissions or discharge data without using them to rate or otherwise 
characterize environmental performance. More than 20 countries have set up such registries.1 
Like the seminal U.S. Toxic Release Inventory, most focus on toxic pollutants not covered by 
conventional regulations. 
The second type of national public disclosure program both reports emissions or 
discharge data and uses them to rate plants’ environmental performance. These programs are 
confined to developing countries and focus mostly on conventional pollutants. Examples include 
Indonesia’s Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation, and Rating (PROPER), which was the 
first such program to appear and is the best known; India’s Green Rating Project; the 
Philippines’ EcoWatch program; China’s GreenWatch program; and Vietnam’s Black and Green 
Books initiative. These programs have been touted as a means of circumventing perhaps the 
most daunting obstacle to pollution control in developing countries: weak environmental 
regulatory institutions. Public disclosure does not necessarily require an effective enforcement 
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Arbor, MI 48104, powersn@bus.umich.edu; Allen Blackman, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC; Thomas 
P. Lyon, University of Michigan, Ross School of Business; and Urvashi Narain, The World Bank. Urvashi Narain 
undertook this research while a research fellow at Resources for the future. We are grateful to the Green Rating 
Project team at the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), India, in particular Chandra Bhushan and Monali 
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capability or even a well-defined set of environmental regulations. Furthermore, the costs of the 
administrative activities it does require—data collection and dissemination—are declining thanks 
to new information technologies [2].  
Notwithstanding the promise and growing popularity of public disclosure, we know little 
about whether it actually improves environmental performance, in either industrialized or 
developing countries. As discussed in the next section, most evaluations to date have been 
anecdotal, and only a few rigorous analyses have appeared.  
To help fill this gap, this paper evaluates the impact of India’s Green Rating Project 
(GRP) on the environmental performance of the country’s largest pulp and paper plants. To our 
knowledge, it is the first rigorous analysis of the GRP’s environmental impact and only the 
second such evaluation of a developing country public disclosure program.2 To identify the 
effect of the GRP, we control for other factors that drive cross-sectional and intertemporal 
variations in pollutant discharges using exceptionally detailed plant-level data, including both 
primary survey and secondary census data.  
Our analysis suggests that the GRP drove significant reductions in pollution loadings 
among dirty plants but not among cleaner ones. This result comports with statistical and 
anecdotal evaluations of similar disclosure programs [2,3,4]. We also find that plants in wealthier 
communities were more responsive to GRP ratings, as were single-plant firms.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
public disclosure and presents a conceptual framework for our empirical analysis. Section 3 
provides background information on the GRP and the Indian pulp and paper industry. Section 4 
describes the empirical framework and the data used in the regression analysis. Section 5 
presents our econometric results, and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework  
This section briefly reviews the empirical literature on public disclosure programs, 
focusing on two questions: do they improve environmental performance, and if so, how? Then, 
drawing on the literature, it presents a heuristic graphical model of public disclosure to underpin 
the econometric analysis.  
                                                 
2 To the best of our knowledge, the only other developing country program that has been rigorously evaluated is the 
PROPER program; see Garcia et al. [3] and Garcia et al. [4] for details.  Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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2.1. Does public disclosure improve environmental performance?  
Only a few papers have evaluated environmental performance rating programs like the 
GRP, but all have concluded that the programs have generated environmental benefits. Of these 
papers, to our knowledge, only two—García et al. [3] and Garcia et al. [4]—present a rigorous 
statistical analysis. Using panel data on both participants and nonparticipants, the authors test 
whether Indonesia’s PROPER drove reductions in water pollution. They find that the program in 
fact spurred significant emissions reductions, particularly among plants with poor compliance 
records. Dasgupta et al. [2] present a largely qualitative evaluation of performance rating 
programs in Indonesia, the Philippines, China, and Vietnam. In each program, the authors find 
that a large number of plants initially rated “noncompliant” improved to “compliant” over time 
(although plants rated “flagrant violators” and “compliant” tended to remain in these categories). 
Without additional statistical analysis, however, one cannot determine whether public disclosure 
or exogenous changes in technological, regulatory, or market conditions were responsible for the 
apparent increase in compliance. Wang et al. [5] provide a more detailed but still primarily 
anecdotal evaluation of the Chinese performance ratings program that suggests it succeeded in 
improving environmental performance. 
Several recent papers evaluate public disclosure initiatives other than environmental 
performance rating programs and also find significant impacts on environmental performance. 
Bennear and Olmstead [6] find that a 1996 amendment to the U.S. Safe Drinking Water Act, 
mandating that community drinking water systems publicly report regulatory violations, reduced 
the incidence of subsequent violations. Similarly, Delmas et al. [7] find that regulations requiring 
U.S. electric utilities to mail bill inserts to consumers reporting the extent of their reliance on 
fossil fuels led to a significant decrease in fossil fuel use. And Foulon et al. [8] find that a policy 
of publicly disclosing the identity of plants that are noncompliant or “of concern” spurred 
emissions reductions in a sample of pulp and paper plants in British Columbia.  
Finally, a number of papers have examined the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory 
[9,10,11,12]. Since the program began in 1986, total reported releases of the toxics it covers have 
fallen by at least 45 percent. However, it is not clear that public disclosure has been responsible 
for this decline. Data on toxic releases are not available for the period preceding the program, or Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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for plants that fall outside the program, and as a result the usual means of estimating releases 
absent the program are not available [6].3  
2.2. How might public disclosure improve environmental performance?  
Tietenberg [1] identifies seven “channels” through which public disclosure may motivate 
improved environmental performance. To simplify the exposition, we group these channels into 
four broad categories.  
Output market pressures. Disclosure may affect the demand for firms’ goods.  
Input market pressures. Disclosure may affect the demand for firms’ securities and the 
firms’ ability to hire and retain employees.  
Judicial pressures. Disclosure may encourage private citizens to initiate tort law actions 
against polluters, motivate private suits to force firms to undertake abatement, and give rise to 
judicial actions in countries whose constitutions guarantee citizens the right to a healthy 
environment (as in India).  
Regulatory pressures. Disclosure may build support for new pollution control legislation 
or better enforcement of existing legislation.  
Based on the literature discussed below, we add two more mechanisms. 
Community pressures. Disclosure may enhance pressures that community groups and 
nongovernmental organizations place on polluters to cut their discharges.  
Managerial information. Disclosure may provide new information to managers about 
their plants’ discharges and options for reducing them.  
Empirical analysis aimed at determining which of those six mechanisms explain how 
various public disclosure programs have their effect is limited. To our knowledge, only a few 
empirical papers have examined this issue as it relates to performance rating programs, like the 
GRP and PROPER. Gupta and Goldar [13] test whether GRP ratings affect the stock prices of 
Indian companies in the pulp and paper, chlor alkali, and automobile sectors (three of the four 
sectors rated by the GRP, the other being cement, which was rated after 2005). They find that 
                                                 
3 Moreover, several papers propose alternative explanations for the observed reductions in toxic releases, including 
the imposition of more stringent conventional regulation [11]; plants’ practice of substituting unlisted toxics for 
listed ones [34]; and simple underreporting of emissions [12].  Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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poor GRP ratings led to significant negative abnormal returns. These results suggest that GRP 
may have an important effect on environmental performance through capital markets. Blackman 
et al.’s [14] survey of managers of plants participating in PROPER generated data suggesting 
that an important means by which the program spurs abatement is improving managerial 
information. Garcia et al. [4] identify characteristics of Indonesian plants that were more 
responsive to PROPER ratings and find that foreign-owned plants, those in more densely 
populated areas, and those with low initial ratings were more responsive, all other things equal.  
The empirical literature on the workings of public disclosure initiatives other than 
performance rating programs has focused mainly on capital markets. Although this research 
clearly shows that public disclosure can affect stock prices [15,16,17], it does not establish that 
the changes in stock prices have, in turn, affected firms’ pollution control activities. However, 
Konar and Cohen [9] and Khanna et al. [18] find evidence suggesting that this can occur.  
Beyond the studies cited thus far, empirical research on how public disclosure per se has 
an impact is quite limited. However, the literatures on “voluntary regulation” and “informal 
regulation” are relevant. The literature on voluntary regulation examines pressure to overcomply 
with mandatory regulations generated by regulators, markets, and courts (see Lyon and Maxwell 
[19] and Khanna [20] for reviews). For example, Segerson and Miceli [21], Maxwell et al. [22], 
and Glachant [23] present analytical models in which firms voluntarily overcomply to preempt 
more stringent mandatory regulation; some empirical research supports this approach [24,25]. 
Arora and Gangopadhayay [26] hypothesize that firms overcomply with environmental 
regulations to attract “green” consumers. Some empirical evidence also supports this proposition. 
Finally, empirical research by Videras and Alberini [24], Sam and Innes [25], and Vidovic and 
Khanna [27] suggests that judicial pressure can also drive voluntary overcompliance.  
The literature on informal regulation focuses on pressures to abate generated by private 
sector agents in developing countries where state regulation is weak or effectively nonexistent 
(see World Bank [28] for a review). For example, Pargal and Wheeler [29] examine the 
environmental performance of plants in Indonesia at a time when regulatory enforcement was 
negligible (and before the PROPER program was initiated); they find that emissions were lower 
in communities with higher per capita income and higher levels of education, implying that such 
communities effectively pressure plants to abate (see also Blackman and Bannister [30]).  Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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2.3. Conceptual framework  
This section presents a heuristic graphical model of public disclosure to underpin the 
econometric analysis (see Appendix 1 for an analytical version of the model). It draws upon the 
standard representation of a plant’s abatement decision in the environmental economics literature 
(see, e.g., World Bank [28]). We assume marginal abatement costs (MAC) are increasing in 
abatement while (private) marginal abatement benefits (MAB) are decreasing in abatement 
(Figure 1). The plant chooses the level of abatement, α*, such that MAC equals MAB.  
 
Figure 1. Marginal abatement cost (MAC) and marginal abatement benefit (MAB) 












Drawing on the literature surveyed in Section 2, we define six channels through which 
public disclosure might affect the firm’s abatement decision. The first five channels have to do 
with the costs that can be imposed on dirty firms by green consumers (g), input (capital and 
labor) markets (k), courts (j), regulatory authorities (r), and communities (c). The sixth channel is 
related to the costs of pollution abatement arising from the plant’s need to acquire information 
about abatement technologies and its own pollutant discharge (t). We use Figure 1 to illustrate 
how each channel might affect the firm’s abatement decision. First, public disclosure could 
either reduce or enhance consumers’ demand for the firm’s output, depending on whether the Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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firm is relatively clean or dirty (g). Either effect, in turn, implies the marginal benefit to the firm 
of cutting discharge will be greater regardless of the actual level of abatement. For a clean firm, 
disclosure enhances its demand, but for a dirty firm, disclosure decreases its demand. 
Graphically, in either case, the MAB curve shifts up and in equilibrium the firm chooses a higher 
level of abatement. Similarly, depending on whether the plant is dirty or clean, public disclosure 
could either raise or lower costs imposed by regulators (r), input markets (k), communities (c), 
and courts (j). Once again, regardless of whether the plant is clean or dirty, each of these effects 
shifts the MAB curve up and results in a higher equilibrium level of abatement. Finally, public 
disclosure could reduce the cost to firms of acquiring information about abatement (t), lowering 
the marginal cost of abatement at every level of abatement. In this case, graphically, the MAC 
curve shifts down, and the end result is a higher level of abatement.  
3. Background  
3.1. Green Rating Project  
The Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), one of India’s best-known and most 
influential environmental nongovernmental organizations, began work on the GRP in 1997. 
According to CSE background materials, the program was urgently needed to shore up India’s 
weak environmental regulatory institutions and was inspired by the Council on Economic 
Priorities, a now-defunct U.S. nongovernmental organization that provided investors with annual 
ratings of the environmental performance of U.S. companies.  
To date, the GRP has rated the environmental performance of large plants in four 
pollution-intensive industrial sectors: pulp and paper, chlor-alkali, cement, and automobiles. 
Plants in the pulp and paper sector have been rated twice (once in 1999 and again in 2004); 
plants in the other three sectors have been rated just once. In each rating, plants are assigned a 
numerical score from 0 to 100 and are awarded symbolic “leaves” depending on their score: five 
leaves for scores of 75 and above, four for 50–74, three for 35–49, two for 25–34, one for 15–24, 
and none for 14 and below. The GRP scores are based on an evaluation of the plant’s life-cycle 
environmental impacts, from the sourcing and processing of raw materials to the manufacture, 
use, and disposal of products. The exceptionally detailed data needed to conduct this cradle-to-
grave analysis are collected from questionnaires administered to participating plants, along with 
secondary data provided by local environmental regulatory institutions and other sources. Both 
the questionnaires used to collect the data and the methodology used to analyze them were 
designed by a panel of leading technical experts in each rated sector. In addition, to ensure Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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objectivity and transparency, the entire GRP program is supervised by a panel comprising high-
level representatives of industry, government, the judiciary, academia, and nongovernmental 
organizations. Lastly, self-reported data from the firms are carefully checked by GRP inspectors 
and compared with the secondary data.  
In addition to informing the public about plants’ environmental performance, the GRP 
also informs plants about their pollution and pollution abatement options. The program uses the 
primary and secondary data it collects to construct a detailed environmental profile of each plant 
and sends it to the facility for review before releasing the ratings to the public. The program also 
publishes specific recommendations for improving environmental performance in each sector. 
Finally, the ratings are released at a high-profile public event by leading public figures. For 
example, some ratings were released by the late Dr. K.R. Narayanan, India’s former president.  
3.2. Pulp and paper sector  
Pulp and paper is a notoriously dirty industry worldwide. The environmental performance 
of mills in North America and Scandinavia, which tend to be much larger and more modern than 
their developing-country counterparts, has improved considerably over the past few decades. 
Indian mills lag behind, with per unit measures of industrial pollution 5 to 10 times higher than 
those of Western plants [31].  
Making paper involves four main steps, all of which generate water pollution: raw 
material processing, pulping, bleaching, and papermaking.4 To reduce pollution loadings, plants 
undertake both pollution control and prevention. All the plants rated by the GRP have 
wastewater treatment plants. In addition, to prevent pollution, mills have eliminated particularly 
dirty inputs, adopted good “housekeeping” measures, improved chemical recovery systems, and 
modified the pulping process.  
As previously mentioned, the pulp and paper sector is the only sector that has been rated 
twice. As a result, survey data on environmental impact indicators and other relevant variables 
are available for several years before and after the first rating. This allows us to construct a 
counterfactual—that is, an estimate of what pollution would have been absent the program—
needed to identify the impact of the GRP. Because the necessary data on environmental 
                                                 
4 See CSE [31] or Schumacher and Sathaye [35] for more detail.  Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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indicators and firm behavior are not available after the second rating, we can analyze the 
effectiveness of only the first rating. 
The first rating included all 28 plants in the pulp and paper industry with a production 
capacity exceeding 100 tons per day in fiscal year 19985 (India’s fiscal year ends on March 31; 
all years referred to in this paper and accompanying figures are fiscal years). Collectively, these 
plants were responsible for 59 percent of pulp and paper production in India. They were 
contacted for the survey in January 1998, toward the end of fiscal year 1998, and asked to 
provide data (that they normally track and record anyway) for 1996 through 1998. The ratings 
for these plants were released by Dr. Manmohan Singh, India’s current prime minister, on July 
18, 1999. All major Indian daily newspapers covered the event. Of these 28 plants, 22 were rated 
a second time in 2004 and responded to questionnaires for 1999–2003.6 Again, the data were 
reported retroactively. For the remainder of the paper we will refer to years 1996–1998 as 
predisclosure and 1999–2003 as postdisclosure.  
3.3. Trends in pollution indicators  
Average annual discharge data for 1996–2003, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, suggest that 
the environmental performance of particularly dirty plants—those that received one leaf in the 
1999 rating—did in fact improve significantly during 1999, the year of the first GRP rating. 
Figure 1 shows trends in chemical oxygen demand (COD), and Figure 2 shows trends in total 
suspended solids (TSS)—two common measures of water pollution.7 Both pollutants declined 
dramatically after 1998 for plants that received a one-leaf rating, but not for plants with higher 
ratings.  
                                                 
5 By way of comparison, the average plant in the United States has a capacity of nearly 600 tons/day [31]. GRP’s 
size criteria excluded more than 500 smaller plants.  
6 Of the six plants that were rated in the first period but not the second, five were permanently closed and one was 
temporarily closed after the first rating.  
7 COD is a measure of the amount of oxygen needed to fully oxidize the organic compounds in water to carbon 
dioxide; it is a linear function of the chemical composition of the organic pollutants in a sample of water. TSS is 
even more straightforward: it is the dry weight of particles suspended in a sample of water and, like COD, is 
typically expressed in mg/L. To properly scale for water use, we convert both measures and express them as 
kg/bdmt of product. This is done by multiplying first by a constant, then by the amount of water used to produce a 
bone dry metric ton of product. Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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Figure 2. Annual unweighted average discharges of chemical oxygen demand (COD) from 22 
pulp and paper plants participating in India’s Green Ratings Project,  







































Figure 3. Annual unweighted average discharges of total suspended solids (TSS) from 22 
pulp and paper plants participating in India’s Green Rating Project,  



































 Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
11 
The fact that the most dramatic reductions in discharges took place in 1999, the year that 
the ratings were released, suggests that the rating prompted improvements in the environmental 
performance of poorly performing plants. These reductions, however, could have been caused by 
contemporaneous changes in technological, market, and regulatory conditions that influence the 
plants’ pollution loadings. For example, they could have been caused by reductions in the 
relative price of cleaner inputs that happened to coincide with the release of the GRP ratings. To 
identify the impact of the GRP, we develop an econometric model that can control for such 
confounding factors.  
4. Empirical framework  
The first goal of our empirical analysis is to determine whether the drops in COD and 
TSS levels depicted in Figures 2 and 3 were caused by the GRP and not by confounding factors. 
In addition, if we find that the GRP was, in fact, responsible, we seek to identify the channels 
through which it had this effect.  
4.1. Econometric model  
4.1.1. GRP’s impact 
To isolate the impact of the GRP, we run separate fixed-effects ordinary least squares 
(OLS) panel-data models for COD and TSS of the form  
 
(1)
it i t 4
i 3 t 2 1 i it
u ONELEAF POSTGRP
ONELEAF TREND POSTGRP TREND y
+ β + ∗ β +




where αi is the plant fixed effect, TREND is a linear time trend, POSTGRPt is a dummy variable 
that takes the value one for the postdisclosure period (1999–2003) and zero otherwise, 
ONELEAFi is a dummy variable for plants that received a one-leaf rating, and xit is a vector of 
confounding factors including plant characteristics, input prices, and measures of regulatory Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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pressure (Table 1).8 TREND allows us to control for exogenous improvements in technology that 
could affect pollution levels prior to and after the information disclosure.9 TREND*ONELEAF 
allows exogenous improvements in technology (both before and after the disclosure) to differ 
between dirtier plants and relatively clean plants. POSTGRPt is included to capture the impact of 
the ratings on firm behavior. Finally, POSTGRPt *ONELEAF allows the effect of POSTGRPt to 
differ between dirty and clean plants.10 To allow for heteroskedasticity across plants and 
arbitrary serial correlation within each plant, we report standard errors that are clustered by plant 
[32].11  
4.1.2. GRP channels 
To analyze the channels through which the GRP potentially affects firm behavior, we run 
separate models for COD and TSS of the form 
 
(2)  
it t 7 6 i t 4
i 3 t 2 1 i it
u POSTGRP TREND ONELEAF POSTGRP
ONELEAF TREND POSTGRP TREND y
+ ∗ β + ∗ β + β + ∗ β +
∗ β + β + β + α =
i i it 5 z z x
 
                                                 
8 Although we expect the error terms in the COD and TSS regressions to be correlated, we do not use a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) approach because there is no reason, a priori, to omit any explanatory variables from 
either of the two regressions. When the same explanatory variables appear in both regressions, SUR is equivalent to 
OLS [36, p. 343] and yields no efficiency gain. The only advantage of SOLS in this case is that it allows for joint 
hypothesis testing across the two regressions. The disadvantage is that SOLS routines in standard statistical 
packages do not allow for clustered standard errors. SOLS results (available from the authors upon request) comport 
with the OLS results presented in Tables 2 and 3: although the individual coefficients of interest are not always 
significant, they have the same sign, and testing the joint significance of these coefficients in both equations rejects 
the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero.  
9 The choice of a linear trend term, as opposed to other functional forms, is based on preliminary regressions using 
predisclosure data. In these regressions, available from the authors upon request, the addition of a quadratic term 
adds little explanatory power.  
10 We also experimented with the possibility that the disclosure program induced a persistent increase in the rate of 
environmental progress (which would be consistent with a change in the slope of the trend term) rather than in a 
one-time shift of the equilibrium path (consistent with a one-time decrease in the intercept term). The most obvious 
way to identify such an effect would be to include an additional trend term that takes only positive values after 
disclosure. However, given the sample size and a high degree of multicollinearity between the postdisclosure trend 
term and the original trend term, this renders identification difficult. Furthermore, regression results (available from 
the authors upon request) suggest that the one-time drop is more consistent with the data than is a change in the 
trend. Accordingly, we proceed without the postdisclosure trend variable.  
11 Although the inclusion of fixed plant effects allows for heterogeneity in the form of a mean plant-specific 
unobservable component, we still need to allow the variance to differ across plants. Also, although it is reasonable to 
assume independence of the error terms across plants, we cannot, a priori, rule out persistence in the error term 
within a plant. Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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where zi is a vector of time-invariant plant and community variables, such as whether the plant is 
part of a conglomerate and the level of community wealth. This specification allows us to 
determine whether plants with certain characteristics and in certain communities responded 
differently to the program. This in turn sheds light on the channels through which GRP has an 
effect. Note that because these community and plant variables are time-invariant, we cannot 
identify their effect on pollution intensity independent of the plant fixed effect. This does not 
pose a major problem, however, since unlike Pargal and Wheeler [29], we are not interested in 
the coefficients on these variables per se. Rather, we are interested in determining whether these 
characteristics have any additional effect once the disclosure program changes the institutional 
landscape.  
4.2 Data  
As discussed above, most of our data come from GRP surveys. In addition, we used data 
from the 2001 Indian census to construct proxies for several community characteristics; data 
from Prowess, an on-line business database, to construct company-level (versus plant-level) 
variables and a regional energy price index; and finally, data from Indiastat, an on-line database 
of Indian statistics, to construct price indices for a number of inputs.12 The independent and 
dependent variables used in the regressions are described below. See Table 1 for summary 
statistics.  
                                                 
12 For information on Prowess, see http://www.cmie.com/database/?service=database-products.htm, and for 
information on Indistat, see http://www.indiastat.com. Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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Table 1. Variables in econometric analysis and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description  Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max. 
COD  Natural log of chemical oxygen demand (kg/bdmt)  3.37  0.90  0.04  5.43 
TSS   Natural log of total suspended solids (kg/bdmt)  2.10  1.07  -2.74  4.08 
POST-GRP  1999 or later (0/1)  0.72  0.45  0  1 
ONELEAF  Received one leaf in 1999 grp rating (0/1)  0.31  0.47  0  1 
TREND  Linear time trend term (1996 = 1, 1997 = 2, … 2003 = 8)  4.74  2.23  0  8 
SCALE  Natural log of output (kg/bdmt)  11.19  0.55  9.84  12.21 
FINALGOOD  Percentage of output that is final (vs. intermediate) product   0.62  0.35  0  1 
PCTBAMBOO  Percentage of fiber inputs from bamboo  0.29  0.34  0  1 
PCTGRASSES  Percentage of fiber inputs from grasses  0.02  0.08  0  0.56 
PCTRECYCL  Percentage of fiber inputs from recycled materials  0.12  0.22  0  1 
PCTPULP  Percentage of fiber inputs from market pulp  0.10  0.22  0  1 
FORSHARE  Percentage of sales derived from exports  0.05  0.05  0  0.20 
PRICE_WAGES Inflation-adjusted  national avg. daily wages for 
nonagricultural unskilled workers 
0.35 0.02 0.32 0.39 
PRICE_CL  Inflation-adjusted national avg. price of chlorine  1.01  0.12  0.83  1.25 
PRICE_NAOH  Inflation-adjusted national avg. price of sodium hydroxide   0.83  0.13  0.68  1.08 
PRICE_WOOD  Inflation-adjusted national avg. price of wood   1.17  0.15  0.96  1.41 
PERMIT  Water effluent permit (0/1)  0.87  0.34  0  1 
EFFRIVER  Percentage effluents discharged into a river (vs. land, etc.)  0.68  0.42  0  1 
WEALTH  Percentage households in subdistrict that own moped  0.41  0.20  0.12  0.79 
SINGLE  Stand alone plant (0/1)  0.45  0.51  0  1 
 
4.2.1. Environmental performance  
Because all 22 plants in the sample have effluent treatment plants, COD and TSS 
measurements reflect posttreatment or “end-of-pipe” quantities. In India, as in most countries, 
regulatory standards for these pollutants are specified in milligrams per liter of effluent. In India, 
however, where water is inexpensive, the use of this metric creates an incentive for plants to 
dilute their liquid discharges. To control for this effect, we measure COD and TSS in kilograms 
(kg) per bone-dry metric ton (bdmt) of pulp and paper product. Our resulting measure, kg/bdmt, 
gives water pollution per unit of product produced. Finally, because we are interested in the 
responses of both clean and dirty plants, we use logged values of both dependent variables so 
that our coefficient estimates measure the relative change in the dependent variable for a given 
absolute change in the values of the respective explanatory variables.  
4.2.2. Confounding factors  
We use a broad set of regressors to control for factors other than public disclosure that 
affect pollution loadings, including variables related to plant characteristics, input prices, and 
interactions with regulators. Unless otherwise indicated, these data were derived from GRP Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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survey data. Among the plant characteristics, SCALE is the log of the amount of final product 
produced by a given plant in a given year (measured in bone dry metric tons because moisture 
content can vary between different classes of products). FINALGOOD is the proportion of a 
plant’s output that represents final products (such as writing and tissue paper) used directly by 
consumers. This variable is meant to proxy for consumer pressure for environmental quality. 
PCTBAMBOO, PCTGRASSES, PCTRECYCL, and PCTPULP measure the proportion of fiber 
inputs derived from bamboo, grasses, recyclables, and market pulp, respectively (wood is the 
omitted category, and agroresidues are also dropped, because these are collinear with plant fixed 
effects). FORSHARE is the share of sales derived from exports, a firm-level variable derived 
from the Prowess database. This variable is meant to capture pressure for improved 
environmental performance generated by foreign investors and consumers.  
Among the input price variables, PRICE_NAOH and PRICE_CL are inflation-adjusted 
country-wide price indices for sodium hydroxide and chlorine, the major chemicals used in the 
pulping and bleaching processes. PRICE_WOOD is an inflation-adjusted national price index for 
wood. This serves as a proxy for fiber input prices.13 Finally, PRICE_WAGES is an inflation-
adjusted national price index for average daily wage rates for nonagricultural, unskilled workers. 
Two variables are used to proxy for changes in regulatory pressure. PERMIT is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the plant has been granted a water effluent permit by its state 
pollution control board and zero otherwise. EFFRIVER is the percentage of the plant’s effluent 
discharged into a river (versus on land or in the sea) in a given year. Effluent discharged into a 
river must, by law, be cleaner, so it is important to control for shifts in the discharge destinations 
of effluents.  
4.2.3. Channels  
We use two variables to establish possible channels of influence, WEALTH and 
SINGLE. We experimented with several other variables that could conceivably be related to the 
                                                 
13 We were unable to find sufficient data to construct similar indices for any of the other fiber inputs—bamboo, 
grasses, agro-residues, recycled paper, and market pulp. However, these prices will generally be related to wood 
prices in India where the fiber inputs are substitutable [31, p. 40]. Also we do not include a variable measuring water 
costs because the price industrial users pay for water is minute and there was no variation over time in the water 
prices for period in question.  Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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level of plant response.14 However, to keep the exposition manageable, we present (in Section 
5.2) only those models in which interaction terms are significant. WEALTH is the percentage of 
households in the plant’s subdistrict (similar to a U.S. county) that own mopeds.15 SINGLE is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if the plant is the unique establishment owned by the 
company, and zero otherwise. This variable serves as a proxy for organizational differences that 
could affect the way different plants respond to the GRP ratings. Any plant for which SINGLE 
equals zero is either part of a larger pulp and paper company or part of a diversified 
conglomerate.  
5. Results  
5.1. GRP’s impact  
As previously noted, Figures 2 and 3 suggest not only that COD and TSS levels are lower 
after disclosure but also that reductions were greatest among the worst-performing plants. The 
first objective of our empirical analysis is simply to test whether these results are statistically 
significant. Two specifications for each dependent variable are presented in Table 2; Model 1 
(for COD) and Model 2 (for TSS) include only regressors related to the disclosure program: 
TREND, POST-GRP, and ONELEAF, along with interaction terms for ONELEAF. Models 3 
and 4 include all time-varying covariates as well.  
                                                 
14 These include LITERACY, the percentage of the population that is literate in the municipality where the plant is 
located; CASTE, the percentage of the municipal population that belongs to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe; 
AGLABOR, the proportion of the workers in the municipality who are either cultivators or agricultural laborers; 
URBANPCT, the proportion of the population in the subdistrict who live in municipalities that are classified as 
urban; and COMPTOWN, the percentage of nonagricultural laborers in a subdistrict who work for the plant. We 
also investigated whether interaction terms involving variables that proxy for other channels were significant. These 
include ENFWATER, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the plant had been fined or faced some other enforcement 
action from the regional pollution control board for water pollution prior to disclosure; COMWATER, a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the plant had been the subject of registered complaints about water pollution prior to 
disclosure; and GOV, a dummy variable that equals 1 for government-owned plants. 
15 The census data provide alternative measures of wealth, all involving the percentage of households owning a 
particular asset (or employing banking services). These measures are all highly correlated, and our regression results 
using other wealth measure are qualitatively identical.  Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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Table 2. OLS regression results: Green Ratings Project impact 
(clustered standard errors in brackets; all regressions include plant fixed effects) 
Model  number  1 2 3 4 
Dependent  variable  COD TSS COD TSS 
TREND  -0.136 -0.12 -0.124  -0.154 
  [0.025]** [0.026]** [0.039]** [0.032]** 
POST-GRP  0.308 0.021 0.201 0.087 
  [0.107]**  [0.109] [0.129] [0.111] 
ONELEAF*TREND  0.043 0.064 0.014 0.066 
  [0.038] [0.043] [0.033] [0.046] 
ONELEAF*POST-GRP  -0.446 -0.445 -0.411 -0.527 
 [0.142]**  [0.154]**  [0.185]*  [0.215]* 
SCALE     0.051  -0.274 
     [0.229]  [0.146]+ 
FINALGOOD     -0.453  -0.242 
     [0.296]  [0.260] 
PCTBAMBOO     -0.529  -0.336 
     [0.357]  [0.344] 
PCTGRASSES     0.545  -0.906 
     [1.247]  [1.377] 
PCTRECYCL     -0.492  -0.927 
     [0.511]  [0.369]* 
PCTPULP     -2.081  0.736 
     [1.524]  [0.911] 
PRICE_WAGES     1.648  4.033 
     [1.262]  [1.769]* 
FORSHARE     -0.473  -2.252 
     [0.639]  [0.727]** 
PRICE_NAOH     0.028  -0.874 
     [0.527]  [0.361]* 
PRICE_CL     -0.191  -0.489 
     [0.220]  [0.238]+ 
PERMIT     -0.061  -0.133 
     [0.088]  [0.077]+ 
EFFRIVER     -4.399  -4.551 
     [1.444]**  [0.790]** 
PRICE_WOOD     -0.186  -1.093 
     [0.503]  [0.363]** 
Constant  3.85 2.695 6.89  10.577 
  [0.066]**  [0.080]** [3.321]+ [1.981]** 
Observations  155 153 154 152 
R-squared  0.49 0.58 0.56 0.64 
Wald  statistic  -1.46 -3.90 -1.10 -2.09 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
18 
 
In Models 2, 3, and 4, the POST-GRP dummy is not significant. In Model 1 it is positive 
and significant, although this significance disappears when all covariates are included in Model 
3. We conclude that the 1999 GRP rating did not have a significant pollution-reducing impact on 
the average plant, including both good and poor environmental performers.  
The interaction terms in Table 2—ONELEAF*TREND and ONELEAF*POST-GRP—
allow us to test a second hypothesis suggested by Figures 2 and 3: following the first rating, one-
leaf plants improved their environmental performance more than two- and three-leaf plants. The 
negative and statistically significant coefficients on ONELEAF*POST-GRP in all four models in 
Table 2 suggest that this hypothesis is correct.  
The important question that follows from this pair of findings is whether the net effect of 
GRP on one-leaf plants was significant. A simple Wald test of the sum of the coefficients on 
POSTGRP and ONELEAF*POSTGRP allows us to test this hypothesis. The results, reported in 
the bottom row of Table 2, suggest that GRP did drive reductions in TSS by one-leaf plants. The 
net effect for COD was not significant, however.  
In all regressions TREND is negative and significant, suggesting that exogenous 
technological improvements in the pulp and paper industry, independent of the GRP, are also 
responsible for declines in pollution loads. The results for the other covariates unrelated to the 
GRP rating shown in columns 3 and 4 are largely consistent with stylized facts about the 
determinants of water pollution in the pulp and paper industry. In Model 4 (for TSS), SCALE, 
PCTRECYCL, FORSHARE, PRICE_NAOH, PRICE_CL, PERMIT, EFFRIVER, and 
PRICE_WOOD are negative and significant, and PRICE_WAGES is positive and significant. In 
Model 3 (for COD), EFFRIVER is negative and significant. These results comport with the 
conventional wisdom that pollution abatement entails economies of scale (SCALE); pollution 
loadings are decreasing in the share of nonwood inputs (PCTRECYCL); plants that export are 
subject to more pressure to improve their environmental performance (FORSHARE); pollution 
loadings are decreasing in the price of polluting inputs (PRICE_NAOH, PRICE_CL, and 
PRICE_WOOD); regulatory pressure spurs abatement (EFFRIVER and PERMIT); and labor and 
pollution abatement are substitutes in production (PRICE_WAGES). It is encouraging that 
coefficients on these regressors have the same sign, if not significance, in Models 3 and 4.  
To assess the economic significance of the estimates, we analyze the effect of disclosure 
on a hypothetical plant that received one leaf in the first rating and had mean values for all other 
covariates, using the estimation results from Models 3 and 4. With GRP disclosure, such a Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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plant’s COD discharges would decrease by 63 percent between 1996 and 2003. However, absent 
disclosure, the plant’s COD discharges would have decreased by only 54 percent. The effect of 
the disclosure program is stronger when we focus on TSS. The plant’s emissions would decrease 
65 percent with the disclosure program but only 46 percent without it.  
Finally, it is important to note that of the six pulp and paper plants that participated only 
in the first round of the GRP, five—those ranked 5th, 17th, and 24th–26th of the 28 plants 
evaluated in the first round—went out of business before the second round was initiated. In at 
least two cases, environmental protests were an important reason.16 Although we do not have 
enough observations to formally model these closures (using a Heckman selection approach), 
they suggest that, if anything, our econometric results probably understate the impact of the 1999 
ratings.  
5.2. GRP channels 
The regressions presented in Table 3 explore whether certain types of plants were more 
responsive to GRP disclosure. We use an identification strategy similar to that employed to test 
whether one-leaf plants were more responsive: we create variables that interact various time-
invariant plant or community characteristics with POSTGRP.17 In addition, we control for the 
possibility that these characteristics affect the slope of the trend term using a second set of 
variables that interact the time-invariant plant or community characteristics with TREND. 
Instead of including all interaction terms in a single model, we include pairs of interaction terms 
corresponding to a single characteristic (e.g., TREND*WEALTH and POSTGRP*WEALTH) in 
separate models. There are three reasons: several of the interaction variables formed are highly 
collinear (in part because all take a value of zero for the three predisclosure years); including 
several sets of these interaction variables simultaneously poses a degrees-of-freedom problem; 
and we are more interested in identifying channels by which disclosure has an effect than in 
identifying the strongest among several closely related channels. To make the exposition 
manageable, we present only those models in which interaction terms are significant. 
                                                 
16 Personal communication, Monali Zeya Hazra, Center for Science and the Environment, March 13, 2007.  
17 Some of the characteristics we use to construct these interaction terms, such as EFFRIVER, display some minor 
variation over time. For these, we calculate the predisclosure average and interact it with the postdisclosure dummy 
to create the corresponding interaction term.  Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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Table 3. OLS regression results: Green Ratings Project channels 
(clustered standard errors in brackets; all regressions include plant fixed effects) 
Model  number  5 6 7 8  9  10 11  12 
Dependent variable  COD  TSS  COD  TSS COD  TSS COD  TSS 
TREND  -0.104  -0.146 -0.13  -0.164 -0.102  -0.162 -0.128 -0.17 
  [0.042]*  [0.029]** [0.034]** [0.031]**  [0.048]* [0.039]**  [0.038]**  [0.035]** 
POST-GRP  0.214 0.384  0.21  0.15  0.252  0.471  0.233 0.192 
  [0.205] [0.156]* [0.164]  [0.136]  [0.228] [0.169]*  [0.164]  [0.129] 
ONELEAF*TREND       0.014  0.064  0.007  0.042 
       [0.036]  [0.046]  [0.037]  [0.035] 
ONELEAF*POST-GRP       -0.379  -0.44  -0.349  -0.329 
       [0.182]*  [0.176]*  [0.211]  [0.211] 
SCALE  0.067  -0.336 0.02 -0.343  0.03  -0.383  0.035 -0.35 
  [0.249] [0.173]+ [0.263] [0.186]+  [0.234] [0.157]*  [0.269]  [0.189]+ 
FINALGOOD  -0.22  0.013 -0.362 -0.224  -0.39  -0.105  -0.475 -0.286 
  [0.334] [0.240] [0.354] [0.263]  [0.304] [0.223]  [0.300]  [0.239] 
PCTBAMBOO  -0.281 -0.055 -0.462 -0.364 -0.405  -0.175 -0.551  -0.416 
  [0.399] [0.319] [0.393] [0.363]  [0.354] [0.299]  [0.354]  [0.351] 
PCTGRASSES  0.653 -0.249 0.262 -1.048  0.964  -0.408  0.53  -1.054 
  [1.115] [1.331] [1.182] [1.363]  [1.296] [1.388]  [1.247]  [1.386] 
PCTRECYCL  -0.292 -0.291 -0.603 -0.977 -0.248  -0.251 -0.501  -0.916 
  [0.504] [0.369] [0.484]  [0.369]*  [0.581] [0.343]  [0.539]  [0.333]* 
PCTPULP  -1.903  1.461 -2.1 0.799 -1.846  1.779 -2.107  0.951 
  [1.602] [0.903] [1.620] [1.032]  [1.653] [0.816]*  [1.634]  [0.989] 
PRICE_WAGES  1.334 3.568 1.473 3.948  1.332  3.562  1.602 3.964 
  [1.262] [1.652]* [1.294] [1.827]*  [1.226] [1.659]*  [1.262]  [1.815]* 
FORSHARE  -0.38  -2.105 -0.365 -2.181 -0.263  -1.962 -0.422  -2.135 
  [0.723] [0.573]** [0.756] [0.700]**  [0.621] [0.509]**  [0.677]  [0.671]** 
PRICE_NAOH  0.021 -0.893 0.005  -0.92  0.05  -0.906  0.028 -0.917 
  [0.530] [0.383]* [0.535] [0.387]*  [0.524] [0.370]*  [0.531]  [0.379]* 
PRICE_CL  -0.169 -0.441 -0.184 -0.465 -0.171  -0.462 -0.184 -0.48 
  [0.197] [0.232]+ [0.203] [0.237]+  [0.204] [0.228]+  [0.221]  [0.233]+ 
PERMIT  0.018 -0.052 -0.005 -0.083 -0.041  -0.09  -0.054  -0.113 Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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  [0.072] [0.105] [0.069] [0.108]  [0.082] [0.093]  [0.084]  [0.097] 
EFFRIVER -2.059  -2.412  -3.52  -4.409 -4.014  -3.304  -4.53  -4.857 
  [1.212]  [0.829]** [1.261]* [1.207]**  [1.610]* [0.993]**  [1.657]*  [0.941]** 
PRICE_WOOD -0.209  -1.08  -0.203  -1.092 -0.154  -1.053 -0.174  -1.078 
  [0.467] [0.361]** [0.469] [0.359]**  [0.489] [0.360]**  [0.494]  [0.356]** 
WEALTH*TREND  -0.13  0.058     -0.136  0.053    
  [0.193]  [0.169]     [0.203]  [0.185]    
WEALTH*POST-GRP  -0.631  -2.607     -0.288  -2.398    
  [1.033]  [0.812]**     [1.030]  [0.928]*    
SINGLE*TREND      0.02  0.079    0.018  0.064 
      [0.038] [0.041]+      [0.043] [0.031]+ 
SINGLE*POST-GRP      -0.292 -0.576      -0.132 -0.446 
     [0.189]  [0.198]**      [0.198]  [0.229]+ 
Constant  4.919 9.449 6.638  11.241  6.742  10.688  7.172  11.673 
  [3.430]  [2.373]** [3.832]+ [3.095]**  [3.298]+ [1.858]**  [4.081]+  [2.886]** 
Observations  154 152 154 152  154  152  154 152 
R-squared  0.54 0.67 0.54 0.65  0.57  0.69  0.57 0.66 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3 presents results from 10 models intended to identify channels through which 
GRP operates. Model 5 (for COD) and Model 6 (for TSS) include WEALTH interaction terms, 
and Model 7 (for COD) and Model 8 (for TSS) include SINGLE interaction terms. As discussed 
below, we include additional models with ONELEAF interaction terms to disentangle the effects 
of baseline environmental performance from other plant and community characteristics: Model 9 
(for COD) and Model 10 (for TSS) include WEALTH interaction terms along with ONELEAF 
interaction terms and Model 11 (for COD) and Model 12 (for TSS) include SINGLE interaction 
terms along with ONELEAF interaction terms. Finally, Model 13 (for COD) and Model 14 (for 
TSS) include all available regressors.  
Turning to the results, first note that even with the inclusion of these additional 
interaction terms, there is virtually no change in the qualitative results on the controls discussed 
in the previous section.  
In both Models 5 and 6, WEALTH*POSTGRP is negative, and it is significant in the 
TSS model. This result suggests that plants in wealthier communities were more responsive to 
disclosure than those in poorer communities. Several explanations are possible. Residents of 
relatively wealthy communities may have been more likely to pressure plants to improve their 
performance following a GRP rating. Alternatively, or perhaps as a result, regulators in such 
communities may have been more ready to crack down on poorly performing plants following 
disclosure.  
Turning to Models 7 and 8, the interaction term SINGLE*POST-GRP is negative and 
significant in the TSS model, implying that plants that are part of a conglomerate or multiplant 
firm were less responsive to GRP ratings than standalone plants. Again, several explanations are 
possible. Plants that are part of a conglomerate may have better access to the human capital 
needed for environmental management, be better informed because they share best practices with 
other plants in the same firm, and/or have better access to the financial capital needed for 
pollution control.  
Though those explanations appear plausible, it is also possible that plants in wealthier 
communities and plants that are not part of a conglomerate were more responsive to disclosure 
because they were dirtier to begin with. Simple correlation coefficients suggest that this may be 
true in the case of standalone plants; the evidence is less clear that dirty plants were located in 
wealthier communities. In Models 9 through 12, we add the ONELEAF interaction terms 
(ONELEAF*TREND and ONELEAF*POST-GRP) to disentangle the effects of baseline 
environmental performance from other plant and community characteristics. In these regressions Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
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the WEALTH and SINGLE interaction terms remain significant, although levels of significance 
are attenuated. These results suggest that the channels proxied for by WEALTH and SINGLE 
interaction terms facilitate environmental improvement above and beyond that driven by the 
simple fact that plants in wealthy communities and those that are not part of conglomerates tend 
to be dirtier.  
5.3 Robustness checks18  
In this subsection we address some possible robustness issues. First, with an unbalanced 
panel covering at most 22 plants over eight years, we have a limited number of observations. 
Therefore, we need to make sure that our regression results are not being driven by outliers. To 
that end we performed an outlier check. We repeated each regression in Tables 2 and 3 22 times, 
omitting one plant in each regression. The ONELEAF, WEALTH, and SINGLE interaction 
terms are significant in each regression.  
A second concern is that several of our regressors, including the composition of fiber 
inputs, as well as SCALE and FINALGOOD, could be endogenous if abatement decisions and 
production decisions are made simultaneously. However, these variables display only minor 
temporal variation, so any endogeneity should be minimal. As a robustness check, we 
reestimated all regressions presented in Tables 2 and 3, omitting the potentially endogenous 
regressors PCTBAMBOO, PCTGRASSES, PCTRECYCL, PCTPULP, SCALE, and 
FINALGOOD. In all cases, our results are qualitatively unchanged, and in Model 13, 
ONELEAF*POST-GRP becomes more negative and marginally significant. We conclude that 
endogeneity is not an important practical concern in this context.  
Finally, note that in the interest of preserving degrees of freedom and concise exposition, 
we have omitted regressors whose inclusion had no effect: real price of coal, vintage of the plant, 
other types of regulatory permits, share of sales spent on R&D, and diversity of the product mix 
produced by each plant.  
6. Conclusion  
We have used eight years of exceptionally detailed survey data on 22 of India’s largest 
pulp and paper plants to evaluate the Green Rating Program, an Indian environmental 
                                                 
18
 These results are available from the authors upon request. Resources for the Future  Powers et al. 
24 
performance public disclosure program. We sought to determine whether a 1999 GRP rating 
caused plants to reduce their water pollution loadings. We have also attempted to shed light on 
the mechanism by which the rating may have done this. We found that the GRP drove significant 
reductions in pollution loadings among dirty plants but not among cleaner ones. This result 
comports with Dasgupta et al.’s [2] finding that performance ratings programs in Indonesia, 
Philippines, China, and Vietnam all led to improvements among plants with moderately poor 
performance records, but not among those with either very bad or good records.  
We also found that pulp and paper plants located in wealthier communities were more 
responsive to GRP ratings, as were stand-alone plants. We hypothesized that the former result 
suggests that environmental performance ratings programs may have an effect by mobilizing 
local communities and/or regulators to exert pressure for reductions in discharges. We 
hypothesized that the latter result implies that performance rating programs are more effective 
when targeted at plants with better access to human and financial capital for pollution abatement.  
This study adds to a thin but fast-growing body of evidence that public disclosure 
programs can be an effective environmental management tool, even in developing countries 
where weak regulatory institutions, limited political will, and other problems hamstring 
conventional pollution control policies. Although an analysis of the costs of administering the 
GRP is beyond the scope of our study, we suspect it has been less expensive than conventional 
policies that involve standard setting and enforcement. If that is indeed the case, then our 
findings indicate that public disclosure programs may be an efficient as well as effective 
environmental management strategy.  
Finally, we note that whereas virtually all national-level performance ratings programs in 
developing countries are administered by state environmental regulatory agencies, the GRP is 
run by a nongovernmental organization. To the extent the GRP is replicable, it suggests that even 
in countries where institutional and political constraints preclude state-run initiatives, public 
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Appendix 1. Analytical model 
This appendix presents a simple analytical version of the graphical model of public 
disclosure in Section 3. To keep the model as simple as possible and focus attention on pollution 
abatement, we assume that the firm makes production and abatement decisions sequentially. First 
it chooses a level of output, q, and a vector of levels of financial and human capital, k. 
Subsequently, it chooses a level of abatement, α, treating both q and k as fixed. We model the 
firm’s second-stage abatement decision only. Note that abatement here may also include 
pollution prevention. The firm chooses α to maximize profit, π, given by 
 
() [] () [] ( ) ( ) d , H d , d t , C q d , g P α − α − α − α = π k W  
where 
 
()()()() H α,d r α,d c α,d j α,d =++ 
and  
 
P(·)  is the equilibrium price of output; 
g  is an index of green consumerism—the sensitivity of P to the plant’s discharges;  
d  is a measure of the public disclosure of information about the plant’s discharges; 
q  is the quantity of output;  
C(·)  is the cost of abatement; 
t  is the plant’s information about abatement technologies and its own discharges; 
W(·)  is a vector of the costs of two types of capital, financial and human; 
k   is a vector of two types of capital, financial and human; 
H(·)  is the total cost of the plants’ discharges generated by external agents;  
r(·)   is costs generated by formal regulatory authorities; 
c(·)   is costs generated by communities; and 
j(·)  is costs generated by courts. 
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Following the literature discussed in Section 2, we make the following assumptions about 
the price and cost functions:  
 
•  the stronger is green consumerism, the lower is the equilibrium price the plant receives 
for its output (P is decreasing in g);
19  
•  the less the plant abates and the more the public knows about its discharges, the stronger 
is green consumerism (g is decreasing in α and increasing in d), the higher are the costs 
of financial and human capital (W is decreasing in α and is increasing in d), and the 
greater are the costs imposed on the plant by external agents (r, c, and j are all decreasing 
in α and increasing in d); and 
•  the less the plant abates and the more information it has about its discharges and 
abatement technologies, the lower is the marginal cost of abatement (C is increasing in α 
and decreasing in t). 
  
Finally, we make the reasonable assumptions that 
•  abatement has a diminishing marginal impact on green consumerism, capital costs, and 
costs imposed by external agents; and an increasing marginal impact on abatement costs 
(g, W, H, and C are all convex in abatement). 
  




























   
The first term in braces represents the marginal benefit of abatement due to an increase in 
the equilibrium price of output (the first term in braces); a reduction in the costs of labor and 
capital (the second term); and a reduction in costs imposed by formal regulatory authorities, 
communities, and the courts (the third term). We will refer to the sum of these three terms as the 
                                                 
19
 To keep the exposition simple, we implicitly assume that the plant is an inherently dirty one—for example, an 
aged coal-fired power plant—so that regardless of its choice of α , green consumerism always reduces equilibrium 
price. We could just as easily assume that the plant is an inherently clean one whose equilibrium price is always 
increased by green consumerism. Allowing green consumerism to increase or decrease equilibrium price depending 
on the plant’s choice of α makes the model needlessly complex given our limited goal of illustrating how various 
channels discussed in the literature operate. 
20
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marginal abatement benefit (MAB). The last term in (A1) is the marginal abatement cost (MAC). 
The plant chooses α* such that MAB is equal to MAC. 
Using (A1), it is straightforward to show that the total derivative of α* with respect to d is 
unambiguously negative. Therefore, public disclosure will increase abatement. Figure 1 makes 
this point graphically. Given our assumptions on P(·), C(·), W(·), and H(·), the MAC schedule is 
increasing in α and the MAB schedule is decreasing in α. The plant chooses the level of 
discharges where these schedules intersect. An increase in d will cause t(·) to increase and the 
MAC schedule to shift down. It will also cause g(·), W(·), and H(·) to increase and the MAB 
schedule to shift up. Each of these shifts will cause α* to increase.  
 